Why Articles 15 and 18 Cannot Cure CEVAWG: A concise case for revision before ratification

The issue

The adoption of the African Union Convention on Ending Violence Against Women and Girls (AU-CEVAWG) reflects an important continental commitment. The urgency of ending violence against women and girls is not in dispute. The question is whether the Convention, in its present form, is legally capable of achieving that objective.

An article-by-article review by African women’s rights organisations and legal experts identified problems that go beyond minor drafting errors. These include fragmented rights and obligations, narrow or inconsistent definitions, an incomplete due-diligence framework, important substantive omissions and weaknesses in monitoring and enforcement.

In response, proponents of immediate ratification argue that two provisions provide an adequate solution:

  • Article 15 will safeguard stronger existing human rights standards; and
  • Article 18 will allow the Convention to be corrected through amendment after it enters into force.

Neither provision can bear that weight.

  1. Article 15 can guide interpretation, but it cannot repair the Convention

Article 15 is a safeguard clause. It seeks to prevent CEVAWG from being interpreted in a way that derogates from principles and values contained in other relevant instruments. It also favours the interpretation that best advances the elimination of violence against women and girls where provisions of CEVAWG contradict one another.

This is useful, but limited.

It can interpret existing language; not supply what is missing

Article 15 may assist where a provision is genuinely ambiguous or conflicts with a stronger applicable standard. It cannot:

  • create a right or obligation that CEVAWG does not contain;
  • insert a comprehensive due-diligence framework;
  • replace narrow or defective definitions;
  • consolidate obligations scattered across the Convention;
  • create an omitted enforcement mechanism; or
  • turn general objectives into precise and enforceable duties.

Interpretation can clarify a text. It cannot rewrite it.

A progressive interpretation is not guaranteed

Article 15 may support a rights-protective interpretation, but it may also be applied narrowly. Its operation depends on the wording of CEVAWG and on the knowledge, approach and understanding of the court, commission or public authority interpreting it.

The African Commission’s own practice illustrates this uncertainty. In Media Rights Agenda v. Nigeria, the Commission adopted a progressive interpretation that prevented domestic law from weakening Charter rights. Yet the same institution has applied Article 59(1) of the African Charter restrictively, maintaining confidentiality practices that affect access to information, transparency, timely justice and participation by interested third parties. A safeguard clause is therefore only as reliable as the text it applies to and the institution interpreting it.

It protects only where a stronger standard already applies

Article 15 preserves existing protections; it creates none. Its value is therefore weakest where:

  • a State is not party to the stronger instrument;
  • domestic law provides a lower standard;
  • the relevant right is not clearly protected elsewhere; or
  • access to a regional or international enforcement mechanism is unavailable or delayed.

Women living under the weakest legal systems may consequently receive the least benefit from Article 15. This would produce uneven protection across States—the opposite of the common continental standard CEVAWG should establish.

  1. Article 18 offers a possibility of amendment; not a promise of correction

Article 18 permits a State Party to propose an amendment or revision. The proposal must pass through several institutional and political stages before being adopted, after which it must meet the Convention’s entry-into-force requirements.

The clause does not guarantee that:

  • a State will initiate the process;
  • States will agree on the nature of the defects;
  • the necessary amendments will be adopted without being diluted or deferred;
  • 15 Member States will ratify each amendment; or
  • all States Parties will accept the amended text.

The amendment procedure is therefore politically contingent at every stage.

“Fix it later” means making the defective text binding first

Article 18 can be used only after States have accepted the Convention as it stands. The sequence matters.

Once the Convention enters into force, its provisions may shape national legislation, policy, judicial interpretation and institutional practice. Governments and institutions may build implementation systems around its existing architecture. Women and girls would then bear the burden of litigating unclear provisions while waiting, potentially for years or decades, for amendments that may never enter into force.

Ratification does not make correction easier. It makes correction harder by entrenching provisions that States have accepted and institutions have already operationalised.

Amendments could fragment the continental standard

Under the general law of treaties, an amendment does not ordinarily bind a State that has not accepted it. Some States could therefore remain bound by the original Convention while others apply an amended version.

The result would be different States carrying different legal obligations under what is supposed to be a common continental instrument. Instead of creating uniform protection, amendment could produce a fragmented and uncertain legal regime.

The defects require comprehensive revision

CEVAWG’s problems are not confined to a short list of provisions that can be repaired through discrete amendments. They concern the structure and content of the instrument as a whole, including:

  • incomplete and inconsistent definitions;
  • fragmented rights and State obligations;
  • the absence of a coherent due-diligence framework;
  • important forms of violence that are not adequately addressed;
  • objectives and principles not translated into enforceable duties; and
  • weaknesses in monitoring and enforcement.

Correcting these problems requires systematic review and redrafting, not a sequence of uncertain post-entry amendments.

  1. Revision remains legally and politically possible

Adoption is not a point of no return. African Union practice shows that adopted treaties and institutional frameworks can be revised, replaced or strengthened when their deficiencies become apparent.

Examples include:

  • The Protocol on the Court of Justice of the African Union (2003): Although it entered into force, the Court was never constituted. The AU instead adopted the 2008 Merger Protocol, which replaced the earlier framework by establishing the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.
  • The African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (1968): The Convention was comprehensively revised in 2003 after its limitations became apparent. The revised Convention replaced the earlier instrument when it entered into force in 2016.
  • The African Maritime Transport Charter (1994): The Charter was comprehensively revised in 2010 during a prolonged ratification and implementation period. The revised Charter entered into force in August 2025.

These precedents demonstrate that AU institutions are not required to accept a deficient instrument merely because it has already been adopted. Where problems are structural, the AU has used revised or replacement instruments rather than relying solely on piecemeal amendments after implementation.

AU-CEVAWG has not yet reached the 15 deposited instruments required for entry into force. The opportunity to revise and strengthen it therefore remains open. Acting now would be simpler and more likely to preserve a single continental standard than attempting to correct the Convention after States have become bound by it.

Pausing ratification would not mean abandoning action on violence against women and girls. States remain bound by the African Charter, the Maputo Protocol, the African Children’s Charter, CEDAW where applicable, and their domestic obligations. A pause would allow the AU to ensure that the new Convention strengthens, rather than fragments or weakens, those protections

The ask

Member States and AU institutions should:

  1. Pause the ratification campaign.
  2. Commission an independent, article-by-article legal review.
  3. Map CEVAWG against existing African and international standards.
  4. Identify its ambiguities, omissions, regressions and structural defects.
  5. Revise the text through a transparent and participatory process.
  6. Resume ratification once the Convention is coherent, enforceable and rights-compliant.

Core message

Article 15 cannot create what CEVAWG omits, and Article 18 cannot guarantee that its defects will ever be corrected. Women and girls should not be required to bear the consequences of a deficient legal instrument today in exchange for an uncertain promise of repair tomorrow.

The responsible course is clear:

Pause. Listen. Strengthen. Then ratify.

 

For the detailed legal briefing on why Articles 15 and 18 cannot cure AU-CEVAWG, visit the Resources section at www.aucevawg.com.