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Briefing Paper – Form Over Substance

The paper analyzes the potential of the recently adopted African Union Convention on Ending Violence Against Women and Girls in addressing technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV). Our conclusion is that the Convention falls short in crucial areas.

Adopted in February 2025, the Convention has been praised for mentioning “cyberspace.” While this acknowledgment is important, it does not lead to effective protections. The Convention fails to specify how member states should protect women in cyberspace or prevent TFGBV. It acknowledges cyberspace as a domain for violence but lacks binding legal obligations for member states.

Read the full briefing paper below:

Form Over Substance: A Critique of the Protection against Tech-Facilitated Violence in the African Union Convention on Ending Violence against Women and Girls

1. Background

One unsurprising outcome of the digital age is the increased use of technology and social media. More and more people are able to easily access technology, social media platforms and even open source artificial intelligence (AI) software in their everyday lives to perform everyday tasks. In a patriarchal paradigm, this increased access has quickly taken on a misogynistic nature that uses the tools and features in technology and social media to perpetrate violence against women and girls; this is referred to as technology-facilitated gender based violence (TFGBV). TFGBV is the weaponising of technology to attack women and girls on the basis of their gender. TFGBV is further defined as any “act that is committed, assisted, aggravated or amplified by the use of communication information technologies or other digital tools that results in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological, social, political or economic harm or other infringement of rights or freedoms (Article 19 2025).”

TFGBV is distinct from other forms of gender-based violence in its scale, velocity and impact. It can be perpetrated remotely, cheaply, anonymously and through content that remains available indefinitely. TFGBV can have serious adverse effects on the physical and mental health of survivors including, stress, self-harm, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and often leads to survivors feeling physically unsafe (Cerise et al. 2024). Further, online violence can exacerbate offline forms of GBV such as sexual harassment, stalking, and intimate partner violence and is often a precursor to physical violence.

There are hundreds of forms of TFGBV, with new forms emerging with the evolution of technology. In 2021, UNFPA identified a non-exhaustive list of 40 distinct forms of TFGBV, some of these include but are not limited to (United Nations Population Fund 2025):

• Doxxing: Posting personal and sensitive information including home addresses, telephone numbers, and names of family members without permission
• Cyber-Mob: A large group of online attackers who threaten, insult and verbally abuse a target, often in an organized/coordinated manner.
• Image-Based Abuse: The use of imagery, often sexual in nature, to objectify, humiliate and harass a target.
• Online Impersonation: Creating a fake profile and assuming someone’s identity for nefarious purposes, including destroying someone’s reputation.
• Sextortion: A type of electronic blackmail, including the demand for money, sex/sex acts or additional explicit images in exchange for not exposing intimate images or private information.
• Cyberstalking: Persistent, unwanted and/or threatening surveillance, contact and/or pursuit through technological means.
• Cyberbullying: A form of online harassment, the constant and intentional infliction of damage through digital technologies to undermine or target an individual’s self-esteem.
• Online Harassment: Repeated conduct that threatens, pesters, scares or abuses someone by sending degrading, offensive or abusive images and/or comments.
• Non-consensual Sharing of Intimate Images: A form of image-based abuse that involves the non-sonsensual sharing of intimate imagery that is objectionable because it suggests consent from and wrongdoing by the survivor as a way to seek retribution.
• Shallowfake: A manipulated image, usually done with editing software such as attaching someone else’s face to a different body; more sophisticated, deepfakes can be done using machine learning.

A 2024 UNESCO study (Chowdhury et al. 2025) estimates that at least 58% of women and girls have experienced online harassment on social media platforms. Women from a diverse background, who are young or living with a disability, adolescent girls and young women are at higher risk of being targets of online abuse and more likely to be victims of TFGBV. A UNFPA study on TFGBV in Kenya’s higher learning institutions found that 90% of young adults have experienced online gender-based violence with female students being disproportionately impacted (Collaborative Center for Gender and Development and University of Nairobi Women’s Economic Empowerment Hub 2024). Women with high-profile jobs or leadership positions such as politicians, journalists, activists, athletes are also more likely to experience TFGBV. In early 2025, researchers tracking African elections uncovered a wave of AI-generated deepfake videos targeting women journalists and female candidates in Ghana, Senegal, and Namibia used synthetic clips designed to humiliate and discredit them, and drive them offline (Miliza, Gichanga, and Kiden 2025). Additionally, women and girls already experiencing family, domestic or sexual violence are especially susceptible to TFGBV.

Abusers use the tools and features on social media platforms to perpetrate TFGBV, these include recommender systems based on algorithms that boost discriminatory content that fuels bias, sexism and misogyny. Reporting tools designed to flag harmful content and behaviour, can be weaponised as part of coordinated attacks against victim-survivors. This misuse, known as mass reporting, is a technique of coordinated abuse deployed as a form of brigading which involves a group of people working together to harass or silence others through high-volume techniques such as mass commenting, posting or reporting. Brigading is sometimes facilitated by the mass creation of fake and imposter accounts and has become a key feature of ‘networked gaslighting’ of women journalists.

Big Tech is a term used to refer to a handful of companies with extreme dominance in the market that wield extraordinary influence over the infrastructure, services and norms that shape our experiences online. Apple, Google, Meta, Amazon are a few of the companies that run the internet to the extent we view these services similarly to utilities such as electricity or water (Amnesty International 2025). These companies dominate key sectors of the internet: from search and social media to cloud computing, ecommerce, and mobile operating systems.This provides them tremendous power to shape public opinion and control the flow of information. The risks of letting a few businesses serve as gatekeepers of the digital public realm are highlighted by documented instances of content removal, uneven moderation, and algorithmic prejudice. The conditions created by the influence and profit-driven practices by Big Tech have a direct impact on the vulnerability of women and their safety online as they create the conditions that allow perpetrators to thrive.

Another major driver of online violence is the increased use of generative AI. Generative AI relies on existing data to create content, this recycling of data means that AI models create biases and these biases are often exploited to spread harm including online violence against women (Devex Partnerships 2024). A study conducted by the Berkley Haas Center for Equity, Gender and Leadership on around 133 AI systems across industries found that about 44% of them demonstrated gender bias, and 25% exhibited both gender and racial bias (Smith and Rustagi 2021). For this reason, generative AI can be manipulated to generate harmful content like deepfake pornography. An industry report based on the analysis of 14,678 deepfake videos online shows that 96% of deepfake videos are non-consensual intimate content and that 100% of the top five deepfake pornography websites targeted women (Ajder et al. 2019). This rapid, uneven, largely unregulated deployment of AI technology and the normalisation of the integration of generative AI models in technology, applications and social media platforms, puts women and girls at a higher risk of online violence.

In contrast, it is becoming apparent that the international, regional and national legal frameworks that are intended to protect victims of GBV are unable to catch up to or keep up with the catalytic impact that technology continues to have on the manifestation of violence against women and girls. This paper expounds on this premise within the context of the recently adopted African Union Convention on Ending Violence Against Women and Girls (AU CEVAWG or the Convention). It evaluates the Convention’s effectiveness in preventing TFGBV, safeguarding victims, and holding perpetrators accountable, while highlighting the gaps and missed opportunities that undermine its potential. In addition, the paper offers a comparative review of international and regional legal frameworks on TFGBV to contextualize the AU CEVAWG’s strengths and shortcomings. Finally, this paper is a clarion call to States to pause the process of ratification of the AU CEVAWG and prioritise refining the Convention for substantive efficacy over procedural formality with respect to the protection of women and girls against TFGBV.

2. Introduction and Analysis of the AU CEVAWG

In February 2025, the African Union adopted the AU CEVAWG. The treaty  is the first of its kind specifically dedicated to ending violence against women and girls across Africa. Yet, for a convention which is expected to bring so much hope, many African feminists, activists and civil society organisations (CSOs) responded to the treaty with mixed feelings. The treaty negotiation emerged from a process that excluded critical women and girls’ rights movements whose decades of advocacy made it possible for such an instrument to even be considered in the first place. The initial treaty text of 156 pages drafted in September 2024 to the final 11-page version in December 2024 raises fundamental concerns regarding compliance with international and regional standards of transparency and participatory governance in treaty-making. In standard treaty making processes, drafts which are usually bulky undergo various stages of consultation and editorial before finally shrinking to an agreeable and manageable document. This process is inclusive of various stakeholders’ inputs including experts and civil society.  However, for the AU CEVAWG, there is no publicly available record detailing this drafting and negotiation process or clearly outlining the criteria and rationale used to determine which provisions were retained, modified, or excluded. Furthermore, there is no clarity on the decision-making structure, specifically, who exercised authority in setting priorities and under what rationale the negotiations and drafts were made. There is also no evidence of extensive stakeholder engagement.  This lack of disclosure appears inconsistent with principles articulated in the United Nations and the African Union Treaty making processes which provide opportunities for extensive consultation, and civil society participation in treaty negotiations and drafting.

2.1 Standards Introduced on TFGBV

Human rights treaties have juridical value because they set legally binding obligations to state parties. Legal standards set the benchmark for state action to translate the black letters of the law into actions that benefit people in communities and clarify state action to meet these obligations. Through the process of ratification, a government makes a commitment to incorporate its obligations into domestic law, and to ensure their enforcement. Individuals can seek redress through domestic and international mechanisms if abuses occur. In treaties intended to be binding, the language and prescriptions of the law are clear and obligatory, binding all states who are party to such a treaty. As new human rights issues emerge, the responsibility is on the state to set up legal standards that guide action and ensure accountability, effective remedies for victims, and create preventive frameworks that adapt to evolving contexts.

Typically, conventions seek to build on existing normative standards, such as those contained in the Maputo Protocol thus expectations for the AU CEVAWG to provide normative standards on TFGBV were notably high. The Convention defines cyberspace under Article 1(b) as ‘a digital medium of communication and interaction of global or interconnected systems.’ This definition fails to capture the specific issue of technology- facilitated gender-based violence, which constitutes a core issue in women’s safety online and offline. The term cyberspace appears seven times throughout the document in the preamble and Articles 1, 3, 5, 8, and 10, while TFGBV is never mentioned in the Convention. The narrow conceptualization of cyberspace as simply a location of harm within the Convention presents significant challenges. By framing cyberspace primarily as a medium of communication and interaction, the treaty risks overlooking the complex dynamics, root causes and damaging consequences that underpin technology-facilitated violence. This limited scope may lead to an undermining of the transformative potential of the normative framework.

Articles 9-13, which provide for state obligations and sets the standards of operation of the document, reveal some significant shortcomings. While these articles reference measures for protection and prevention, they fail to articulate concrete, enforceable standards for state action against TFGBV explicitly. This omission is critical given the growing prevalence of violence against women and girls facilitated by various technological tools and with digital platforms now spaces for abuse.

2.2 Gaps and Missed Opportunities in the AU CEVAWG

The treaty in its current form makes an important stride in acknowledging violence that happens in cyberspace but falls short of embedding it as a core dimension of VAW. The treaty introduced the concept of public, private and digital sphere which muddies the water and limits the understanding of why these spheres are important in the context of violence against women. The concept of the public and private sphere in the context of violence against women and girls are historically and structurally significant and reflect not only where violence occurs, but the obligations of the State and how law and policy have evolved to respond. The private sphere traditionally encompasses the domestic domain such as the home, family, and intimate relationships where violence often manifests as intimate partner violence, emotional and psychological violence among others. Historically, these acts were dismissed as ‘private family matters,’ beyond legal intervention, until feminist advocacy reframed domestic violence as a societal issue, leading to legal reforms and support systems.

Conversely, the public sphere includes spaces outside the home such as workplaces, streets, schools, and community spaces. Violence in public spaces manifests as harassment, public assault, stalking, and trafficking. Violence in public spaces has generally been more visible and actionable under law than private violence. Thus, introducing cyberspace as a third “sphere” alongside public and private poses a risk of fragmentation of conceptual as well as normative clarity. Further, the concept of cyberspace as a third sphere treats violence online as peripheral rather than integral to the continuum of violence women face across physical and digital spaces, from the cradle to the grave. This means that violence online or cyberspace as a mere “location of harm” ignores the systemic nature of technology facilitating gender-based violence. Additionally, this reinforces the false illusion of a distinction between online and offline violence, where it is a key feature of TFGBV that it causes real and tangible harm to victims, whether physical, sexual, psychological, social, political or economic.

The identification of cyberspace as a mere space of violence manifests in the document in the definitions captured in Article 1(k) and under the scope in Article 3(b). Article 1(k) provides as follows:

‘‘Aware that violence against women and girls manifests in different forms, including femicide, and occurs in public and private spheres, and in cyberspace, in times of peace, armed conflict, transition, post-conflict, disaster and post-disaster situations, and may constitute a violation of international humanitarian law’

Similarly; Article 3(a) describes the scope of the Convention to cover ‘all forms of violence against women and girls, in public and private spheres, and in cyberspace’

By these provisions in Article 1 and 3, cyberspace is treated as a location of harm rather than a distinct and pervasive sphere with unique risks, mechanisms, structures and legal implications that have caused the death of many women across Africa. Article 2 provides for the right to live free from violence ‘Every woman and girl has the right to be free from all forms of violence, which right is indivisible from and interdependent with other human rights and fundamental freedoms’. Article 3 then provides for the scope as seen above. By splitting this right into two separate articles introducing Article 3 as the scope of application and then adding cyberspace as an additional sphere, the convention inadvertently blurs the established public-private divide. This approach reinforces a problematic framing of cyberspace merely as a ‘location of harm’. The opportunity here would be to merge Articles 2 which provides for the right to live free from violence and 3 into a single consolidated provision affirming the right to be free from violence facilitated by technology as a systemic issue with a holistic normative framing.

The Convention further missed an opportunity to provide shared accountability in ending violence against women facilitated by technology and instead took a state-centric approach. This approach fails to recognise the critical role that Big Tech, social media platforms and internet intermediaries play in the promotion and elimination of TFGBV. Articles 5(a) and 8(c) place primary responsibility on states, ignoring the shared accountability of tech companies, employers, digital platforms, civil society, and users. This failure to integrate shared accountability, and platform governance, which are core issues in platform regulation ignores current realities of violence against women and girls facilitated and assisted by various forms of technology. This gap also overlooks the dynamic nature of digital ecosystems and workplace realities, particularly in online and hybrid environments. Women engaged in digital workspaces such as gig platforms and remote work face embedded layers of violence. The convention thus missed an opportunity to create a link for implementation between economic issues and violence facilitated by technology.  This omission limits responsiveness to emerging patterns of harm affecting women in precarious or tech-mediated employment.

Furthermore, Article 10(b)(iii) calls for engaging media and social platforms but lacks specificity on accountability mechanisms, algorithmic transparency, and content moderation standards, which are critical for addressing online violence effectively. This is another missed opportunity for setting real standards of engagement for media and platforms.

Article 9 conditions the protection of women and girls on the existence and adequacy of national laws, effectively deferring responsibility to domestic frameworks.

‘‘State Obligations to Protect Girls in the World of Work. States Parties shall, in accordance with their national laws: a) protect girls from harmful labour practices and all other forms of violence; b) eliminate factors that compel girls to undertake harmful work; c) conduct surveys and reviews to assess the progress made towards ending violence against girls in the world of work.

This approach is problematic in subjecting the standards in a regional treaty to national laws. By linking obligations to national legislation, AU CEVAWG will lead to fragmentation of standards. States with weak or outdated laws can claim compliance without meaningful reform, creating uneven levels of protection across jurisdictions. The AU CEVAWG also fails to include any reference to the need for transnational cooperation, which is integral to the adequate response to TFGBV which often sees perpetrators transcending borders. This is a challenge for the effective protection and response to TFGBV.

2.3 Comparative Regional and International Normative Standards

There are a number of existing laws that guarantee protections for women against TFGBV on the continent and it was anticipated that the AU CEVAWG would build on the existing standards to create a harmonised approach to the elimination of TFGBV, however, this was not realised. The failure of the AU CEVAWG to adequately address TFGBV leaves a fragmented legal regime with various frameworks addressing the issue in a piecemeal fashion. The resultant effect is watered down protections for women and inapplicable State obligations. Various treaties, protocols and resolutions read together offer various guarantees on freedom from discrimination, freedom to expression, the rights to dignity, privacy and freedom from violence, which are critical for online safety for women and girls. In addition, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has provided progressive jurisprudence on the obligation of States in upholding online safety for women. We explore the various provisions, the opportunities and shortcomings below:

The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (The African Charter)

This is the seminal treaty on human rights on the African continent and is binding on 54 out of 55 African States that have ratified it. The African Charter came into force in 1986 before the widespread use of the internet; however, it contains provisions that impose obligations on States to ensure the safety of women online. The African Charter guarantees every individual the enjoyment of freedoms and rights without distinction on the basis of gender, national or social origin, race, fortune or other status. With regards to online safety, the right to dignity and prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as guaranteed in Article 5 may be used as protection against online offences. Article 9 guarantees the freedom of expression and dissemination of opinion; however, this must be exercised within the law. Women’s freedom from discrimination is guaranteed in Article 18(3), which requires that States ensure the protection of women as stipulated in international declarations and conventions. Notably, under Article 27, the African Charter places a duty on individuals to exercise their rights and freedoms without discrimination and in a manner that maintains and reinforces mutual respect and tolerance. The provisions on freedom from discrimination are critical as they recognise the root causes of violence against women, whether online or offline, are discriminatory. TFGBV against women occurs because they are women and it disproportionately affects women, and is therefore discriminatory against women. The provisions of the African Charter read together effectively prohibits any treatment that may be considered discriminatory against women and can be read to include TFGBV, though this was not anticipated at the time of the drafting and when the Charter came into force.

The Protocol on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol)

The Maputo Protocol is one of the most progressive legal instruments on women’s rights globally, and provides for the rights of women in Africa, outlining a wide range of substantive and procedural entitlements for African women and encompassing civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of women in Africa. It entered into force in 2005 and is currently ratified by 46 out of 55 countries in Africa. Further to entitlements of African women, it contains various obligations States must meet in order to ensure the enjoyment of the various rights guaranteed in the Protocol. Relevant to online safety are the provisions on the elimination of all forms of discrimination in Article 2, the prohibition and elimination of all forms of violence against women and the prevention and condemnation of trafficking of women in Article 4, the guarantee of the right to dignity and the obligation of States to adopt appropriate measures for the prohibition of exploitation and degradation of women in Article 3. Critically, the Maputo Protocol enshrines the internationally recognised principle of States’ Due Diligence obligation to eliminate all forms of violence against women. This principle requires States to adopt and implement all appropriate measures for the prevention, protection, investigation, prosecution and punishment of violence against women. This principle is stated in Article 4 of the Protocol, which outlines various measures that States must adopt in order to guarantee the safety of women, including addressing root causes and pursuing attitudinal changes that are the main drivers of violence against women. The due diligence obligation of States recognise that States are in contravention of their duty whether the violence occurs in private or public and whether it is perpetuated by public or private actors. These provisions, though adopted before the proliferation of the internet and the rise in online violence, taken together, cement the obligations of States to ensure the safety of women users of the internet.

Communication 734/19 – J v The Republic of Namibia

In a decision communicated on 20^th June, 2025, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (African Commission) declared that the Republic of Namibia, the Respondent State, was in violation of Articles 2, 5 and 18(3) of the African Charter, as well as Article 2 and 4(2)(g) of the Maputo Protocol. The Complainant, J, filed the case at the African Commission seeking an enforcement of the obligation of States to act with due diligence to prevent trafficking, to investigate and prosecute traffickers and to assist and protect trafficked persons. This case is significant since J experienced TFGBV as she was recruited for a job via Facebook, only to be lured to a different country and detained for a period of 3 months and sexually exploited for this entire period. This case demonstrates the real and long-lasting effects of online violence.

In its decision, the African Commission found that Namibia not only failed to conduct an effective investigation, prosecute and punish J’s perpetrators, but also through its agents participated in conduct that further victimised her. Further, the Commission found that Namibia violated the right to human dignity and the right to freedom from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.

The African Commission also conducted an analysis of substantive equality and impeached the comparator test adopted in its earlier decisions determining the right to equality and non-discrimination. The Commission found merit in the substantive equality approach taking into account the intersecting factors and vulnerabilities and the resulting disproportionate impact of violence and trafficking in persons on women. The Commission concluded that Namibia had violated J’s right to equality and non-discrimination. While the decision didn’t take into account the TFGBV that was faced by J, the analysis in this decision creates jurisprudence to hold perpetrators accountable and provide victims with remedies.

African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (Malabo Convention)

The Malabo Convention was established to provide a regulatory framework on cyber-security and personal data protection as its title suggests. It recognises the ever-evolving nature of the internet and technology and provides general principles for establishing a credible digital space for electronic transactions, personal data protection and combatting cybercrime. The Convention establishes a wide range of cyber related offences including hacking, identity theft and cyber fraud and provides for the investigation and prosecution of these crimes. The Convention also recognises the right to privacy, putting into place various protections for the collection, storage and processing of personal data and highlights the role of transnational cooperation in combatting cybercrime and the protection of personal data. The Convention fails to provide any of the gendered aspects of cybercrime and has been widely criticised for being overly vague, broad and outdated, as national legislation in a number of countries are far more progressive in comparison. The Convention merges cybersecurity and personal data protection which complicates its implementation since national regimes often adopt differing regulatory strategies for the various issues. Finally, the Convention fails to include a mechanism for the oversight of its ratification and implementation. As a result, it came into force in 2024, 10 years after its adoption, and currently only 16 countries on the continent have ratified it. This Convention does not offer robust protection for women against TFGBV.

Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to information in Africa

This Declaration was adopted by the African Commission in 2019 and gives life to the provisions of Article 9 of the African Charter on freedom of expression and the dissemination of information. The Declaration recognises freedom of expression is critical for the realisation of all other human rights, as well as the need to protect these rights for marginalised groups, including women and sexual and gender minorities, among others. Principle 37 recognises the principle of equality in providing access to the internet and Principle 39 requires States to require internet intermediaries to mainstream human rights approaches in the moderation of content, transparency in the removal of content and provide effective remedies where violations occur. This refers directly to the role of Big Tech in the provision of safety for users of the internet and is a welcome principle in ensuring safety of women online. Principle 7 and 42(7) provide for the obligation of States to take specific measures for the protection of women providing that “States should take specific measures to address the needs of marginalised groups (including women) in a manner that guarantees the enjoyment of their rights to freedom of expression and access to information on an equal basis with other[s]”; and that “harmful sharing of personal information, such as child sexual abuse or non-consensual sharing of intimate images, shall be established as offences punishable by law” respectively. This Declaration, while having very progressive requirements is soft law, is not binding on States, and they cannot therefore not be held accountable for failing to put in place measures to comply with these provisions.

Resolution on the Protection of Women Against Digital Violence in Africa, Resolution 522 of 2022

The African Commission in 2022 adopted this Resolution requiring States to take a number of measures in order to combat TFGBV. This is the only regional instrument that explicitly provides for the obligation of States in protecting women against TFGBV and is a welcome development. It provides that States introduce a number of measures including: Adopting legislation to combat all forms of digital violence against women; conducting research on digital violence; carrying out awareness-raising programmes; providing for access to education in digital technology to increase equality in access to the sector; conducting mandatory and continuous training for agencies dealing with victims of TFGBV; cooperation between law enforcement agencies; and victim-centered approaches in combatting digital violence. The Resolution is similar to the earlier Declaration in that it is not binding and further does not recognise the role of artificial intelligence and Big Tech in the rise of digital violence against women.

UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UN GPs)

It is critical to acknowledge the role Big Tech and internet intermediaries play in the increase of TFGBV, and the need for regulation and policy to respond. While there are no binding international or regional standards for the regulation of technology companies, the UN GPs provide guidance that is applicable. The Guiding Principles state that they apply to all States and to all business enterprises, both transnational and other business enterprises regardless of their size or location. They recognise the role of business enterprises as specialised organs of society performing specialised functions and they are therefore required to respect human rights. The UN GPs articulate the responsibility of businesses to respect human rights including avoiding contributing to adverse human rights impacts and effectively addressing these impacts when they occur. In application to internet providers and intermediaries this includes the setting up of community guidelines that are responsive, effectively monitoring content and ensuring transparent and victim-centered approaches for complaints and compliance with community guidelines. The UN GPs also provide that the human rights responsibility of businesses is proportional to its size; recognising the transnational nature of the context in which the entities operate is critical. While the UN GPs are all encompassing and apply to Big Tech as well, they are limited in nature since they don’t recognise the gendered nature of human rights abuses caused by TFGBV.

In summary, while there are a number of regional and international standards that are applicable to TFGBV, they are fragmented and limited in scope, therefore not providing effective protection for women, failing to articulate specific binding obligations of States to eliminate all forms of TFGBV and failing to recognise the unique role tech platforms can play regarding the elimination of TFGBV. It is therefore a critical gap in the AU CEVAWG to comprehensively address TFGBV, leaving African women to continue enduring harm as a result of TFGBV.

3. Call to Action

#PauseforPurpose: In recognition of the manifest missed opportunities in the AU CEVAWG, we call upon States to pause the processes of ratification of the AU CEVAWG and to prioritise its amendment to align it with existing international and regional standards, build on existing protections and thereby bolster the protections for women and ensure tech accountability for TFGBV.

Adopt Legislative and All Appropriate Measures: In recognition of the real harm that women face due to TFGBV, States must adopt legislative and all other appropriate measures to ensure the elimination of all forms of TFGBV including: addressing root causes by raising awareness and campaigns for attitudinal and behavioural changes; reviewing and strengthening all existing national legislation and policies to respond to TFGBV; streamline process for reporting and investigation of offences; conduct mandatory training for state agencies to adopt victim-centered approaches in investigation and prosecution; and establish effective cross-border cooperation to eliminate TFGBV.

Victim-Centered Approaches: States must ensure that all measures taken are victim-centric, ensuring that the procedural and substantive rights of victims are embedded in all legislation, policy and institutional framework adopted in combatting TFGBV. Victims must have access to psychosocial support and comprehensive remedies for the online and offline effects of TFGBV.

Big Tech Accountability and Reform: Big Tech and internet intermediaries must adopt a zero-tolerance approach to TFGBV, embed safety features in the design of infrastructure, services, algorithms and norms and integrate gender-sensitive and human rights approaches in their operating procedures. Community guidelines, content monitoring, moderation and evaluation must be transparent, accessible and geared towards the prevention and response to TFGBV.

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